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not explicitly an amnesty system. By its terms, the deferral provision
neither authorizes permanent amnesties nor provides any standards for
deciding when to do SO.
4 7
I suggest, instead, that the Statute ought to provide that the
International Criminal Court will not pursue cases where doing so
would breach a valid amnesty. This proposal, of course, would require
distinguishing between "valid" and "invalid" amnesties. This is a
difficult task, but not an impossible one. Indeed, South Africa's
example again offers useful guidance. We might fairly say that a valid
amnesty is, like South Africa's, one that satisfies three conditions:
first, it has been agreed to by the parties most directly concerned;
second, that agreement is not simply an oppressive element of a
"victor's peace"; and third, the amnesty does provide victims of
human rights abuses with some meaningful form of recognition,
satisfaction and redress.
Perhaps such a proposal would enable these two great modem
impulses of human rights law-punishment and reconciliation-
simultaneously to achieve recognition.
Professor Ruti Teitel
PROFESSOR TEITEL: It is a pleasure to have the opportunity to
engage in this discussion with Justice Goldstone. We are in debt to
him for the historical sweep and ethical force of his remarks.
I would like to follow up on some of the thoughts raised in the
narrative that Justice Goldstone has put forth here today. In his
words, the narrative of justice in this century is "paradoxical."
47 Another route to a form of amnesty lies in the discretionary power of the
Court's Prosecutor to refrain from initiating an investigation or undertaking a prosecution,
in light of "the interests of justice," including such factors as "the gravity of the crime and
the interests of victims." Id. art. 53(I)(c) & (2)(c). These provisions can be read simply
to authorize familiar acts of individualized prosecutorial discretion, though they could
also encompass a prosecutorial decision to forego a wider range of prosecutions in light
of considerations including the possibility of reconciliation. The language surely is not
intended, however, to authorize-much less require-a program as generous as South
Africa's. On the contrary, the provision for review of such decisions by the Court, id. art
53(3), suggests the drafters' desire to cabin the prosecutor's power not to prosecute.
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Consider how the stories Justice Goldstone has told, and the narrative
he has put forth actually involves two stories. One could be thought
of as a millennial vision, and the other as anti-millennial. Let us
unpack this a bit. The millennial vision might go this way: the
suggestion is that in this century, the international community has
been in a process of moral development, a process that has come to a
culmination in a normative consensus regarding international criminal
law. Whereas in the anti-millennial view Justice Goldstone has also
alluded to, one salient to this panel, how do we make sense, given the
appreciable increase in normative law of the upsurge in political
violence seen at the end of the century. On this account we may be on
the brink of a dark ages to come; accordingly, we ought to establish
processes and structures that might allow us to prepare for that reality.
The highly paradoxical vision Justice Goldstone has
introduced is evident in the context of the contemporary legal debate
being waged this week in New York in Prep Comm deliberations
concerning the proposed permanent International Criminal Court.48
Let us return to the question of the narrative, and the extent to
which this could be thought of as a millennial vision, a culmination of
the International Human Rights movement, the historical legacy's
genesis in the postwar period, and in the international community's
response to the war-time atrocities.49 If the narrative begins there, at
mid century, then the normative human rights scheme commences in
the legal response to the World War II atrocities, and in the now
familiar corpus of international human rights instruments: the
Nuremberg Charter,"0 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1
the conventions such as various other international covenants,52 the
Genocide Convention," and subsequently many others. 4
48 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N.
Doc.A/CONF.183/9 (July 17, 1998).
49 See generally Ruti Teitel, Human Rights Genealogy, 66 FORDHAM L. REV.
301 (1997).
50 Charter of the International Military Tribunal, concluded at London, Aug.
8, 1945. 84 U.N.T.S. 279; 1946 U.K.T.S. 27; Cmnd. 6903, 145 B.F.S.P. 872, 59 Stat.,
1544 E.A.S. 472; 1 reprinted in 2 Weston II.E.1.
51 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res.217A, U.N. GAOR, 3rd
Sess., Pt. 1, Resolutions, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
52 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A
(XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, reprinted in 6 ILM 368 (1967);
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If we begin the story there, what emerges is a historical
normative continuity that is reflected in contemporary developments,
particularly in the attempt to institutionalize and entrench the accepted
legal response. This particular conception of human rights, and,
impliedly, its view of the right response to human rights violations, is
a primarily judicialized and procedural model of rights.
The ongoing force of the postwar legacy is evident in the
salience of an international court entrenching the Nuremberg tribunal,
and its paradigmatic form, the criminalization approach to the
enforcement of human rights protection. As in the judicial model,
because the relevant offenses are considered the most heinous, the
proposed Tribunal's jurisdiction, at least in theory, is deemed
"universal." This view of rights also implies a certain view of the
self, of the individual as responsible agent, and of human rights
adjudicated best by a court, competent to make individualized case by
case deliberations.
This conception of human rights is appealing to us, chiefly
because it is highly compatible, if not entirely derivative from our
understandings of rights in American constitutionalism. Indeed, this
confluence of traditions goes some way towards explaining the
substantial support human rights advocates and constitutional lawyers
in this country have lent to this conception of human rights. There is
an analogy dating back to the postwar period of international human
rights to the domestic scheme. Thus, going back to the beginnings of
the human rights movement, the attendant wave of constitutionalism
at that time55 may help to explain the direction since that period, and
the ultimate entrenchment of the postwar judicial model.
To some extent, it is the postwar judicial model of
international human rights that prevails, and is being entrenched in the
proposed permanent international criminal court. Yet, the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, (1996), G.A. Res.
2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, reprinted in 6 ILM 360 (1967).
53 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277; 1951 A.T.S. 2; 1949 Can. T.S. 27; 1970 U.K.T.S. 58,
Cmnd 4421, 151 B.F.S.P. 682; S. Exec. Doc. 0 818-8, at 7-12.
54 See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331;
1969 U.N.J.Y.B. 140; 1980 U.K.T.S. 58, Cmnd. 7964; reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969).
55 Louis HENKIN, AGE OF RIGHTS (1990).
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engendering circumstances of the post war period no longer abide,
raising the question of, given the conceded changed political
circumstances and legal developments, to what extent ought there to
be an attendant transformation of the conception of human rights. 6 In
the contemporary political context, can the intended model meet
normative expectations? The problem goes beyond the problem of
enforcement to the abiding sense that there is a failed rights regime.
Indeed, the gap between the current political realities and the
normative scheme that explains the tension in the contemporary rights
model.
In light of this genealogy, let us reconsider the paradoxical
account outlined by Justice Goldstone, for it elucidates the undeniable
sources of tension in the human rights narrative. This century is
denoted by the expansion in the development of humanitarian law-
but also and concededly the repeated attempts at genocide: Cambodia;
the Iraqi campaign against the Kurds, "ethnic cleansing" in Rwanda
and Bosnia. At some level, these would appear to be failures of
international criminal justice and political will. Until the present
moment, there had been discussion, but few meaningful developments
towards an International Criminal Code. No International Criminal
Tribunal had been convened since Nuremberg, until recent years, the
ad hoc tribunals convened at the Hague, and the newly proposed
permanent International Criminal Court (I.C.C.).
Consider the significance of the new institutionalization: for
the move towards establishment of the ICC reflects the entrenchment
of the Nuremberg model at century's end. The question then is, what
do these new normative developments and proposed institutions
signify for the direction of human rights? One might think that these
developments add little because many of the human rights norms are
already in place, such as conventions protecting against genocide and
war crimes. Thus, for some time the international system has had a
Genocide Convention which, to date, has lacked an implementing
body. Moreover, its normative provision has not been adequate,
allowing some might say for politicization of the human rights
response. For a long time there has been a failure to establish the
56 Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of
Individuals Rather Than States, 32 AM .U. L.REv. 1, 32 (1982).
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requisite international machinery. The absence to date of full
institutional protection is due to the problem of political will; the very
same historical political context that also generated the Genocide
Convention with its particular view of atrocity, and relatedly human
rights and their protection. 7 This is just to say that the convention is a
legal response that is itself situated, and contingent with the political
circumstances of the times. Nevertheless, a closer look at political
circumstances may shed light on the engendering origins of the
dominant model.
Thus the sad undertone to Justice Goldstone's inspiring
remarks inheres in the paradoxical status of human rights today, rights
understandings deriving from a mythic Nuremberg legacy that is so
well entrenched that we tend today to conceptualize the human rights
regime in its light. The post war rights regime continues to shape and
direct contemporary developments. For it is in its shadow that the
existing state of affairs is construed as a diminished narrative. Given
changed political circumstances, as well as other human rights
developments, entrenching this historical model-despite changes-
means that it will, of necessity, operate in circumstances different
from those of the foundational precedent. Consider some of the
implications: the purposes of and aspirations for the ICC way exceed
those of the postwar period, and, yet, are nevertheless subject to the
rule of law expectations associated with institutions functioning in
ordinary times. This tension, for instance, is clearly evident in the
understanding of the International Criminal Courts' jurisdiction. On
the one hand, the ICC's jurisdictional principles go beyond those
historically associated with international criminal tribunals, whether at
Nuremberg or the Hague. Nevertheless, international criminal
jurisdiction is conceived as "complementary," meaning its application
is limited to instances where states are "unable" or "unwilling" to
prosecute their own. The notion of jurisdiction as "complementary"
constitutes a contemporary understanding of the plausible relationship
of international to national law, a mediating understanding of
jurisdiction. As such, the Tribunal's ability to assume jurisdiction
transcends the postwar circumstances associated with occupation and
57 See Beth Van Schaack, Note, The Crime of Political Genocide. Repairing
the Genocide Convention's Blind Spot, 106 YALE LI. 2259 (1997).
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zero sovereignty and attendant rules of jurisdiction. So, the Tribunal
is authorized to assert its jurisdiction over certain offenses wherever
countries are either unable or unwilling to prosecute. Indeed, one
might expect this to occur in transitional circumstances, because of
the frequent absence of institutionalization, and the unavailability of a
functioning, uncompromised judiciary and other institutions at such
times. One might consider this role as the Court's extraordinary
transitional function. In these circumstances, in liberalizing regimes
following dictatorship, the Tribunal provides an alternative to national
courts for the traditional functions of ascribing individual punishment
for the most heinous offenses. It redirects attention to the individual
in the international system, and underscores individual responsibility
at a time when communal violence is being constructed in explicitly
ethnic terms. The hope is that such proceedings will provide the
deterrence and rule of law associated with criminal proceedings and
an idea of accountability consonant with liberal transitions to
democracy.
What can it do beyond this? The ICC is clearly more than just
another court. There are broader expectations for the role of
international criminal justice. Beyond the expected occasional and
sporadic prosecutions, the Court's apparent significance lies in its
ongoing communicative and educative role. International criminal
law codified in the ICC charter comprises a symbol of growing
international normative consensus. Though institutionalization and
ratification precedes normative consensus-the ICC nevertheless
stands as a symbol of shared aspirations. No doubt, this is an
unorthodox role for a court, but the International Criminal Court is-
likely to work in a very different way than our ordinary conception of
a national court. 8 It sends a signal, as part of a development of
agreement to a minimal procedural rule of law, capitalizing upon the
symbolic force of the condemnatory power of the criminal sanction.Over time, the'ICC could perhaps play a role in fashioning a
normative consensus of a more enduring sort than that ordinarily
constituted by a judicial review. This is not the usual relation politics
bears to justice. There are glimmerings of just this sort of
58 MARTIN SHAPIRO, CouRTs: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS
(1981).
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development of political consensus in the ongoing deliberations over
the operation and procedures of the International Criminal Court.59
This may be one of the most promising and significant aspects of the
developments in human rights discourse at the end of the century.
Public, discussion such as this, itself may make a contribution
to that discourse.
JUSTICE GOLDSTONE: I might respond briefly to the suggestion
that has come from Professor Ellmann. It was put a slightly different
way to me at Yale University earlier this week. It was put to me in
this way: If there was a permanent International Criminal Court in
existence in 1994, really before that, in 1990, wouldn't it have
prevented a peaceful negotiated settlement and the death of apartheid
in South Africa? Wouldn't it have prevented a truth commission in
the South African form because it would have insisted on prosecuting
and no amnesty?
It seems to me that the question and the suggestion really are
mixing two different worlds, and I think one must keep them apart. I
think we've got to envisage a world where there is an effective, active
permanent international court and what the consequences will be on
the one hand, and the world we are living in today, the world in which
the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission exists, a
world where there is no permanent International Criminal Court.
I hope I'm not being either naive, unrealistic or pipe dreaming,
but in a world where there is an effective judicial system, there should
be and would be no room to grant amnesties to some of the worst
criminals that one can imagine. It's unacceptable, in any real terms,
that people come before the South African Truth Commission and
admit to murdering people, blowing up bodies, cooking people
alive-some of the terrible confessions and admissions that have been
made before the South African Truth Commission. In any decent
system, those people should not be considered for amnesty. They
should be tried and punished.
59 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
183/9 (July 17, 1998).
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